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ABSTRACT: We introduce several new resilience metrics for quantifying the resilience of critical material supply chains
to disruptions and validate these metrics using the 2010 rare earth element (REE) crisis as a case study. Our method is a novel
application of Event Sequence Analysis, supplemented with interviews of actors across the entire supply chain. We discuss
resilience mechanisms in quantitative terms−time lags, response speeds, and maximum magnitudes−and in light of cultural
diﬀerences between Japanese and European corporate practice. This quantiﬁcation is crucial if resilience is ever to be taken into
account in criticality assessments and a step toward determining supply and demand elasticities in the REE supply chain. We ﬁnd
that the REE system showed resilience mainly through substitution and increased non-Chinese primary production, with a
distinct role for stockpiling. Overall, annual substitution rates reached 10% of total demand. Non-Chinese primary production
ramped up at a speed of 4% of total market volume per year. The compound eﬀect of these mechanisms was that recovery from
the 2010 disruption took two years. The supply disruption did not nudge a system toward an appreciable degree of recycling.
This ﬁnding has important implications for the circular economy concept, indicating that quite a long period of sustained
material constraints will be necessary for a production-consumption system to naturally evolve toward a circular conﬁguration.
■ INTRODUCTION
Sustainability as envisioned by industrial ecology entails industry
moving away from stand-alone, once-through operation to an
interconnected, complex web of interlocking industries that
minimize waste and maximize reuse.1 Likewise, the circular
economy concept−commonly deﬁned as an economic system
‘in which we keep resources in use for as long as possible, extract
the maximum value from them whilst in use, then recover and
regenerate products and materials at the end of each service life’2
−requires a massive increase of interdependency with respect to
material ﬂows. There is however an unfortunate side eﬀect of this
increasing complexity. Disruptions in one part of the system can
snowball and have major and unforeseen eﬀects elsewhere.
Complexity leads to unexpected risks, especially with respect
to criticalmaterials. This “cost of interdependence” associatedwith
increased interconnectedness can be addressed through resil-
ience−deﬁned as ‘the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance
and reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain
essentially the same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks’.3
Resilience is essential for designing truly sustainable systems based
on industrial ecology or circular economy principles.4
As summarized by Wang et al.,5 resilience is often featured in
material sciences (the ability of a material to return to its original
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shape after deformation),6 social sciences (the ability of people
to deal with signiﬁcant adversity),7 and ecology (the ability of
an ecosystem to bounce back from or resist disruption).8 The
ecological deﬁnition of resilience underpins a great deal of work
on information and communication resilience9 and supply chain
and manufacturing resilience.5,10
Resilience is a natural ﬁt for the study of material criticality,
which deals with (potential) disruptions of supply chains of those
materials critical to society. Sprecher et al. argued that ‘one
can deﬁne the criticality of a material in terms of how resilient
its supply chain is’.11 DeWulf et al. added the observation that
incorporating resilience as an explicit factor in criticality
screening ‘could overcome the fuzziness of having recent/
current versus future-oriented elements in the criticality cal-
culation. (...) By proposing a clear split in between criticality
calculations based on recent past/current characteristics and
resilience that can be based on future potential characteristics,
we may come not only to a better common interpretation
of criticality but also reduce the level of uncertainty in the
calculation’.12
Up until now, the eﬀects of disruptive events on critical
materials have mainly been investigated through scenario
modeling. Materials are judged on the ability of projected supply
to meet projected demand.13−16 Current scenario modeling
looks at risk factors but does not take into account how fast a
supply chain can rebound from a disruption. For example,
Roelich et al. performed a dynamic criticality assessment of a low
carbon transition scenario, developing indicators for supply
disruption potential and exposure to disruptions that change
over time in response to the technological development pathway
given in their scenario.17 While a useful exploration of how to
quantify the disruption side of the resilience equation, they
explicitly excluded factors related to how the supply chain can
respond to disruptions, such as substitutability and recycling,
both of which play a crucial role in resilience.
To build scenarios that take resilience into account, one
needs−currently unavailable−quantitative information on how
supply chains of critical materials respond to disruptions. This
knowledge gap is addressed in the present work.
We introduce several novel resilience metrics speciﬁcally
suited to quantifying the resilience of critical material supply
chains to disruptions and validate these metrics using the 2010
rare earth element (REE) crisis as a case study. We look speciﬁ-
cally at NdFeB rare earth magnets. This exceedingly powerful
type of permanent magnet is invaluable for a quick transition to a
sustainable energy system.11 China, the world’s largest producer
of REEs, had long since contemplated using its dominant
position in the primary production of REEs to force companies
to move more of their production chains to China. This would be
more proﬁtable than exporting relatively low-value REE ore or
alloys.18 While already implementing a long-term export quota,
an unrelated diplomatic incident with Japan involving the
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands led China to unexpectedly block the
export of REEs. This caused major disruptions in the supply
chains of electrical vehicles, wind turbines, and many other
industries. These industries had, until then, never considered
themselves at risk to these types of incidents.
In our previous work on the NdFeB system we developed a
qualitative framework for assessing resilience in material supply
chains. This framework consists of four primary mechanisms that
promote resilience.11 On the supply side, 1) diversity of supply
(e.g., primary production in diﬀerent countries, recycling) is a
crucial mechanism to prevent disruptions, while 2) stockpiling of
materials can buﬀer against the impact of temporary supply
disruptions. On the demand side, producers have the option of 3)
improving the properties of metal alloys to reduce critical
material demand, especially with respect to dysprosium content
in the case of NdFeB magnets. Finally, 4) substitution can play a
signiﬁcant role in dampening the eﬀects of a supply disruption, in
this case study either by swapping NdFeB magnets for other
types of magnets or by (temporarily) switching to a diﬀerent
technology that does not rely on permanent magnets. As can be
seen in Figure 1, each of these four mechanisms is only available
to speciﬁc actors in the NdFeB supply chain. The mechanisms
inﬂuence each other primarily via the neodymium price feedback
loop.
In order to quantify the speed and signiﬁcance of these
resilience mechanisms we analyze the NdFeB case study with a
novel application of the Event Sequence Analysis (ESA) method,
augmented with information from interviews. ESA is very
suitable to the low data environment often encountered when
investigating critical materials, as well as other noncritical minor
metals. The indicators introduced in this work are used to assess
the contributions of the individual resilience mechanisms to the
overall resilience of a critical material supply chain, in this case
study that of NdFeB. This quantiﬁcation is a step toward
determining the elasticities in the critical material supply chains
and is crucial if resilience is ever to be taken into account in
scenario work. We will also reﬂect on the implications of our
results for the design of future circular material ﬂows.
Figure 1. Conceptual resilience model of the NdFeB supply chain (black) and the associated resilience mechanisms (green) as developed in our
previous paper.11 The blue arrows indicate the direction of inﬂuence: S = same, O = opposing.
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As Meerow and Newell write, ‘quantifying some resilience
characteristics would help us expand our knowledge of the
relationship between resilience and sustainability’.4 In the
present study we aim to contribute to this ongoing discourse.
Review of Selected Resilience Quantiﬁcation Liter-
ature. Pizzol (2015) proposes to incorporate resilience in Life
Cycle Assessment (LCA) via scenario modeling.19 This is rele-
vant work, since LCA databases include many critical materials;
but no work beyond a hypothetical example has been published
as of yet, and indeed Navarrete-Gutieŕrez et al. suggest in an
analysis of the ecoinvent database that signiﬁcant changes to the
basic LCA data structures need to be made before it can be used
as a tool for measuring resilience.20
While not addressing resilience directly, Comtois and Slack
discuss the dynamic determinants of the global iron ore supply
chain, ﬁnding that there is little concern for disruption, although
the possibility exists of temporary but very costly interruptions of
shipping routes.21 Olson analyzes the aluminum supply chain
through the lens of complexity theory and ﬁnds examples of
seemingly small events havingmajor unforeseen consequences.22
Outside the ﬁeld of material criticality, resilience has been
extensively studied. Quinlan et al. and Hosseini et al. provide an
extensive review of resilience quantiﬁcation.23,24 Here we discuss
the approaches most relevant to material criticality analysis.
In the ﬁeld of supply chain resilience, Pettit et al. introduce a
supply chain resilience framework and quantify that in follow-up
work using a survey tool to ask workshop participants to gauge
the resilience in a corporate environment. This framework identi-
ﬁes seven categories of vulnerabilities. Resilience is then concep-
tualized through a set of managerial controls that counterbalance
these vulnerabilities. This approach is very interesting, especially
when focusing purely on the corporate level, but from the
perspective of our work the method of relying on workshop
participants does not produce quantitative insights of the type
that we are looking for (i.e., in terms of physical units).
Indeed, literature on quantitative assessment of resilience in
terms of physical units is relatively rare.25 One approach is to
estimate the economic production of a system in its alternative
ecological states, which is then used to calculate the beneﬁt of
having resilience against switching from a high value state to a
lower value state, as i.e. done by Walker et al. for water levels in
Australian farmland.26
Resilience can also be quantiﬁed by looking at existing, static
indicators and investigating how these indicators would change
in response to disruptions. This was for instance done byMilman
et al.27 In the context of urban water systems, they developed
a Water Provision Resilience indicator, which is based on an
existing indicator for the percentage of the population with
access to safe water. The new resilience indicator improved on
the previous static indicator by adding a dynamic aspect: the odds
of maintaining or improving the current level and quality of
access to water over the next 50 years, despite disruptions, such as
a strong population increase.
Rose introduced a dynamic economic resilience indicator that
deﬁnes how regional economic output is impacted by a dis-
ruption, i.e. an electricity outage.28 Resilience is interpreted
by Rose as the avoided economic damage, i.e. the maximum
hypothetical damage minus the actual damage incurred by the
resilient system. This makes sense when doing theoretical
modeling of resilience, but ﬁnding the maximum hypothetical
damage caused by a disruption is challenging in real-world case
studies.
Conceptually, the resilience loss indicator introduced by
Bruneau et al. is strongly related to our work. It is deﬁned as
R = ∫ t0
t1[100 − Q(t)]dt where R represents the loss of Q during
the time period of disruption, t0−t1.
29 In the work of Bruneau
et al. Q would be quality of infrastructure as it is impacted by an
earthquake.
In the present work, Q could represent the loss of critical
material supply. However, we are not convinced that the
resulting R−which would stand for percentage of disrupted
production−is immediately meaningful for comparing the vastly
diﬀerent supply chains of critical materials. Instead, we focus on
quantifying the factors that inﬂuence how fast critical material
supply chains can bounce back from disruption.
■ METHODOLOGY
Event Sequence Analysis. Through literature research and
discussions with experts we identiﬁed a number of actors for each
position in the supply chain. We included in the analysis at least
one actor for each supply chain position and major end-point.
These actors−40 in total−were chosen because they were both
key players in the supply chain and because of data availability.
We employed event sequence analysis (ESA), an empirical
approach to the longitudinal study of social processes, to identify
the type of actions each actor undertook and how these actions
developed over time. ESA was chosen because it facilitates
empirical investigation of processual phenomena, thus allowing
us to make the dynamic nature of resilience mechanisms explicit.
ESA enables us to study the unfolding of disruptions and
resilience mechanisms as sequences of events and allows for
the further qualiﬁcation of events to capture information that is
relevant to the development/measurement of quantitative
indicators.30,31
Our application of ESA proceeds through several basic steps.
First, longitudinal data on the activities of the actors relevant to
our case study were collected via interviews and Internet searches
(e.g., Factiva, company Web sites), mainly articles in the media,
press releases, and company annual reports. These data are
recorded in a data set, the entries of which are referred to as
incidents. Incidents are qualitative descriptions of the activities of
actors, each consisting of the following:32
1) the date at which the incident occurred,
2) description of the incident,
3) the actor(s) involved, and
4) the source of the information.
After the data are collected, the incidents are coded to make
explicit what resilience mechanism each incident is indicative
of.33 More speciﬁcally, by assigning codes to the incidents we
parse them into events that capture diﬀerent moments in the
unfolding of resilience mechanisms. Chronologically ordered,
our complete data set of events thus oﬀers a rich description of
the resilience mechanisms under investigation and the way in
which these mechanisms are embedded in the overall process.
From the characteristics of events that make up the identiﬁed
mechanisms we also derive other information on interest, such as
how long certain activities take (e.g., from announcing the inten-
tion to build a new mine until operational start of that mine) and
which actors were active in diﬀerent stages of the unfolding of the
mechanisms.
In order to triangulate our results, we supplemented the event
sequence analysis with general production statistics obtained
directly from industry sources and through interviews with
Environmental Science & Technology Article
DOI: 10.1021/acs.est.6b05751
Environ. Sci. Technol. 2017, 51, 3860−3870
3862
16 experts from across the NdFeB supply chain (see the SI for
more information). Figure 3 was made using Gephi.
Indicators for Resilience in the Supply Chains of
Critical Materials.We operationalize each of the four resilience
mechanisms with the following quantitative parameters:34 1) the
time lag between the disruption and the moment that a measure
actually starts to have a quantiﬁable eﬀect on the system (this
includes both the reaction time until, for example, the decision is
Figure 2. Number of events over time, as tracked in our event sequence database.
Figure 3. Each event in the database is tagged with a category and one or more countries. The node size indicates the frequency of events. Countries that
occur in an event together are connected.
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made to open a new mine and the time required for that new
mine to come online); 2) the speed with which the mechanism
can scale (i.e., learning curve, the speed with which a producer
can scale up a change in production from its initial reaction to its
desired ﬁnal amount); and 3) the maximum magnitude of a
mechanism’s eﬀect (e.g., the maximum amount of neodymium
obtained through recycling). Time lag is given in years, response
speed as % of overall market volume per year, and maximum
magnitude in % of overall market volume.
With respect to data quality, we are conﬁdent that the present
description is an accurate description of how the sector as a
whole responded to the 2010 disruption. Given the opaque
nature of the REE sector and the wide diversity between actors,
it would be very challenging to increase the accuracy of our
results beyond the order of magnitude presented here. Since the
REE price was elevated for a limited time only, this case study
does not showwhat the responsemagnitude would be in case of a
more permanent disruption.
■ RESULTS
In the following paragraphs, we will ﬁrst give overall results of the
event sequence analysis and then discuss each mechanism
individually and ﬁnally the system as a whole.
We tracked 220 events in our event sequence database.
Figure 2 illustrates that the number of resilience events spiked in
the aftermath of the 2010 crisis and again roughly two years later.
We can also see that the majority of events are related to primary
production and that recycling accounts for as many events as
substitution and changing of material properties combined.
Figure 3 shows which events, categories, and countries are
most prevalent in the database and how they are connected. New
primary production accounted for the majority of events and is
connected to a constellation of countries where exploration for
new REE mines was at some point announced. More often than
not, this was also connected to Japan, a country that was very
active in exploring all the resilience mechanisms.
Feedback Loops through the Price Mechanism. The
price spike of NdFeBmagnets in the latter half of 2010 (Figure 4)
incentivized actors across the supply chain to change their
behavior. The price mechanism forms the overarching feedback
loop through which the supply and demand of neodymium
inﬂuence each other.
A functional supply/demand feedback loop requires the
existence of a transparent market. As an indicator of the existence
of such a market we suggest the ratio of material traded on the
spot market (i.e., where trade is public and delivery is close to
immediate) compared to the total market volume. Unfortu-
nately, it proved to be impossible to obtain the necessary data.
Furthermore, a much wider comparison with other materials
would be necessary to determine at which ratio a supply/demand
feedback loop would become functional. We do know that
although the Chinese government has attempted to establish
a spot market, the majority of REEs are still not traded in a
transparent manner.35
Not only transparency of the market itself is of importance but
also the transparency of companies along the supply chain. A lack
of ﬁnancial transparency (e.g., publication of annual reports) will
hinder access to fresh capital from outside sources if companies
need to expand due to a sudden increase in demand (interview
Chatham House).
Diversity of Supply. Having various sources of raw material
can reduce the impact of a supply disruption on the remainder of
the supply chain. In the resilience framework we distinguish
between primary production, recycling, and illegal mining and
smuggling as sources of diversity of supply.11 While diversity
of supply can be seen as a uniﬁed mechanism from a resilience
point of view, there are marked diﬀerences between the actual
realization of recycling and mining infrastructures. We therefore
analyze these sources separately. We will not consider illegal
mining and smuggling due to lack of data.
As a high-level indicator of diversity of supply, we use
the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman index (HHI), which is equivalent to
Simpson’s diversity index (D) as used in ecology:36 the market
shares of relevant companies are squared and summed, providing
a score between 0 and 10,000. An HHI of 10,000 indicates a
single producer monopoly. In contrast, low HHI values indicate
that market shares are evenly distributed among a great diversity
of producers. An HHI above 2,500 is considered to be highly
concentrated, indicating high market power of larger pro-
ducers.37 Calculating the HHI for each step in the supply chain
allows one to assess which step is most critical from a diversity of
supply point of view.
Figure 4 shows that the HHI for primary REE ore production
and NdFeB production have opposite tendencies.
With respect to primary production, there was an extreme
market concentration in the years before the crisis, indicated by
a HHI value slightly above 9,400. Chinese producers held an
estimated 98% market share. In the years following the 2010
crisis the HHI index dropped to values of around 7,400.
Although the 2010 crisis led to a noticeable increase in the
diversity of primary REE ore production, the opposite is the case
for the production of NdFeB: diversity declined at a steady pace
and is estimated to keep doing so in the foreseeable future. When
looking at the data underlying the HHI calculations we see
that this is caused by an increasing market share of Chinese
producers, while the share of producers from other countries
(mostly Japan) remains constant.
Figure 4. Herﬁndahl-Hirchman Index of REE primary production and NdFeB magnet production showing the extreme concentration of REE
production in China prior to the 2008 crisis and its subsequent redress. The dotted line for market concentration of NdFeB production is based on
industry forecasts for the 2014−2020 period.38 The purple line gives the price of neodymium in its oxide form.39
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So far, we assumed that strong national policies of Japan and
especially China imply that the sum of companies within each of
these countries can, from a policy perspective, be analyzed as
single actors. To verify this assumption, we analyzed the per-
company HHI for NdFeB production (comparable data for
primary production was not available). We found that globally
the biggest company (Beijing Zhong Ke San Huan High-Tech
Co., Ltd.) had a 13,500 tons production capacity at an estimated
65% utilization rate, giving it a 12% worldwide market share,
while all the other companies had market shares of 6% or
smaller.38 This results in an HHI index of ∼300, indicating that
on a company level there is no market concentration and thus
a single company does not have the market power to cause a
signiﬁcant disruption. This low HHI score on a company level
but very high HHI score on a country level supports the general
narrative that the 2010 disruption can be attributed to decisions
made at the level of national policy, rather than by decisions
made by a few dominant producing companies.
We note that there are some limitations to the data: the
primary production HHI is based on overall REE production
data per country.40 We make the reasonable assumption that
since REEs are always coproduced together this is proportional
to primary production of metallic neodymium.41 The NdFeB
HHI is based on production in Japan, China, and the aggregated
production of the rest of the world. This simpliﬁcation does not
inﬂuence the results, since the production in the rest of the world
is negligible. For NdFeB production we include a forecast over
the period 2015−2020.38
New Primary Production. Our research indicates that the
most publicized response to the 2010 REE crisis was to build new
dedicated REE mines, while the most eﬀective response in terms
of quantitative output was increasing levels of REE coproduction
from existing mines.
Dozens of junior mining companies (i.e., companies that focus
solely on exploration) were hopeful to be the ﬁrst to supply
jittery western and Japanese REE consumers with non-Chinese
supply, as did a number of precrisis REE projects (e.g., Molycorp,
Lynas). Their cumulative eﬀorts can be seen in Figure 5, which
clearly reﬂects the 2010 crisis, both the reduced Chinese output
(from a high point of 130,000 tons in 2010 to 95,000 tons in
2014) and the subsequent increase in non-Chinese production
(from 3,500 tons precrisis to 16,000 tons in 2014). Figure 5
shows that the time lag between the crisis and the increase in
non-Chinese production was less than one year. This quick ramp
up of production indicates that the production uptick was due
to increased REE coproduction at existing mining projects. Our
event analysis ﬁnds that the time lag between announcing the
intention of starting to mine REEs and actual production is
4 to 13 years.
Although the relatively low current REE prices have seemingly
caused most truly new REE mining projects to be put on hold,
it is still plausible that new production capacity will come online
somewhere in the coming decade. As it stands, the actual impact
of non-Chinese REE production seems to be limited, with the
maximum year-over-year increase of REE production outside
China being 5,000 tons (∼4% of total production volume) for
2012−2013. Because these 5,000 tons are still signiﬁcant
compared to the 20,000 tons shortfall, it seems that the rate of
additional primary production will slow down in the near future.
This also bears out in the fact that the 2013−2014 increase is
smaller than the increase for 2012−2013.
Recycling. We distinguish between two types of recycling:
preconsumer recycling of material lost during magnet manufac-
turing (e.g., grinding losses, defects) and postconsumer recycling
of NdFeB from End-of-Life equipment and products.
Preconsumer Recycling. Before the 2010 crisis, preconsumer
waste was not recycled because of economic feasibility issues,
although at least one trading company stockpiled the potentially
recyclable material (see the stockpiling section). Preconsumer
recycling is currently done via two processing routes (interview
Hitachi):
1) Melting and strip casting, which can be done either at the
magnet manufacturer or its supplier. For this processing route
the material must be of good quality (i.e., low oxidation). This is
usually the case for batches with production defects, such as
cracks or insuﬃcient magnetic strength. Only 1−2% of total
production is recycled in this way.
2) Acid leaching, where the alloy elements are separated in
their oxide forms. This route is used for grinding losses, which,
depending on factors such as ﬁnal shape of the magnet and
quality of grinding equipment, accounts for 10−20% of total
production.
Postconsumer Recycling. Although many lab-scale processes
for recycling NdFeB have been reported,42 realistically one has
to either return the material to the REE reﬁnery stage for acid
leaching or use magnet-to-magnet recycling technologies.41 The
latter has the downside that the recycled material needs to be
very uniform if a high grade of NdFeB is to be produced. Product
design and collection infrastructure greatly inﬂuences the unifor-
mity of recovered material and imposes practical limitations
compared to the total amount of NdFeB that could theoretically
be recycled. Previous research has shown that for the coming
decade, NdFeB recycling is highly likely to be limited to the
recovery of material from computer hard disk drives (HDDs).43
Figure 5. Primary production or REEs over time, per country.
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Our event analysis shows that before the 2010 price spike there
was mostly academic interest in the recycling of postconsumer
NdFeB. The crisis sparked a ﬂurry of commercial activity, with
press releases announcing the imminent start-up of at least seven
recycling factories throughout 2011−2013. However, the actual
availability of recycled NdFeB remains negligible, indicating that
either there is currently no commercial scale recycling or that
recycled material is sold in unpublished takeoﬀ agreements, used
internally, or does not reach the market for other reasons.
Economically viable postconsumer recycling is complicated
to achieve for three main reasons: ﬁrst, the inherent ease of
oxidation of NdFeB makes it desirable to seal the magnets to
stabilize them, which makes it more diﬃcult to recover the
magnets during the End-of-Life phase. Second, the amount of
NdFeB is usually too small to warrant signiﬁcant eﬀort (e.g.,
manual labor) to liberate the magnet. Third, the many diﬀerent
grades of NdFeB (with diﬀering chemical compositions) make it
diﬃcult to achieve high quality level recycling.
Quantiﬁcation. We found little evidence of large-scale
recycling in our event sequence analysis. Based on interviews
we can construct the following learning curve for NdFeB recy-
cling: the time required to go from start-up to small-scale
recycling of computer hard disk drives (HDDs, 40 t/y) is 5 to
8 years. Because of diﬃculties associated with collecting enough
HDDs it can then take another 2 to 10 years to increase that
production by an order of magnitude. Figure 6 shows the upper
and lower boundary of recycling, based on information that the
ﬁrst steps toward the recycling of NdFeB fromHDDs were made
in 2007. The upper boundary is based on previously estimated
maximum recoverable NdFeB volumes. The maximum NdFeB
production from recycledmaterial is dependent on the lifetime of
products containing NdFeB, the total production at the begin-
ning of the lifetime of those products, and the collection rate.43
We observe that the recycling of NdFeB seems to follow the
lower bound of our estimates.
Stockpiling. Stockpiles act as a buﬀer that can lessen the
impact of temporary supply disruptions. The great variety of
NdFeB alloys means that stockpiling magnets is not feasible
(interview Arnold magnetics). Rather, smelters could stockpile
rare earth oxides and use those to produce the speciﬁc NdFeB
alloy in demand.
Timely stockpiling seems like a straightforward insurance
against supply chain disruptions. Especially for producers of the
ﬁnal product, for whom the cost of the material is usually trivial
compared to the value of the ﬁnal product. However, for the
smelter actor the costs of stockpiling is signiﬁcant, as producing
REE alloys is their core business. We have found that there is
either no willingness from ﬁnal product produces to provide
capital to smelters for a stockpile or that the lines of com-
munication are simply too long for coordinating such a scheme.
The act of stockpiling can in itself increase demand, thereby
driving up prices. For example, Japanese car manufacturers were
caught oﬀ guard by the impact of the Chinese export blockade on
their manufacturing capability and started building a dysprosium
stockpile at the height of the crisis. One of the largest REE
traders, Santoku (Japan), had relatively large stocks of grinding
waste because it had an oral agreement with its customers to
recycle that material. However, it had not been economically
viable to do so before the crisis, so they had stored the material,
which amounted to a year’s worth of stock. During the height of
the crisis, their customers demanded that Santoku would stock
2 years of supply, forcing them to buy an additional year’s worth
of material at the highest cost. Later, when the cost of thematerial
went down again, they could not recuperate this high price from
their customers. Overall, this caused a loss of billions of yen for
smaller players and tens of billions of yen for larger players in
this part of the REE supply chain (interview Biko Chemical
Company).
Quantiﬁcation.Measuring stockpiling is relatively straightfor-
ward: number of months the supply chain could sustain itself
while the supply is disrupted. The complicating factor in deter-
mining the optimal size of a stockpile is that the choice of which
supply disruptions to target and how long these are expected to
take is subjective and relies on past experience. By its very nature
this cannot take into account as yet unknown types of future
disruptions, i.e. ones that have not occurred before or that will
occur too many steps removed in the system to be foreseeable.
In sectors that have mandatory stockpiles (e.g., certain types of
metals, oil) stockpile size is usually set at 1 to 3 months.
Although the indicator for stockpiling is relatively straight-
forward, quantiﬁcation of current stockpiling levels is not. There
seems to be a very large disparity across industries as well as
cultures. Before the crisis, German companies had 5 weeks’
worth of NdFeB in storage, while Japanese companies had
several months of supply. This reﬂects a diﬀerence in cultural
aversion to risk, which also is a necessary perspective for under-
standing why some Japanese companies reacted to the Chinese
embargo by increasing their stockpile to two years, while a more
typical reaction of European producers was to rely on their
stockpile and subsequently to use lower grade magnets or accept
temporary production stops. Other factors, such as diﬀerences
in the market positioning of ﬁnal products may also have played
a role. At the time of writing, Japanese car companies hold a
stockpile of 6−12 months (interview Nissan), whereas European
companies still have a stockpile of only 2−5 weeks (interview
Rohstoﬀallianz).
Changing Material Properties. Magnet producers have
responded to supply constraints by improving the properties
of NdFeB, greatly reducing the required amount of dysprosium
for high temperature resistant magnets. For instance, using grain
boundary diﬀusion allows for a more precise deposition of
dysprosium in the NdFeB microstructure, increasing function-
ality. This technology was available relatively quickly because the
necessary basic research had already been performed in earlier
R&D, the aim of which was to increase the maximum temper-
ature resistance of NdFeB magnets. Although at that time the
increased production costs associated with grain boundary dif-
fusion proved to be prohibitive, the extreme price increase of
dysprosium turned it into a viable proposition (interview
Hitachi).
Figure 6. Upper and lower boundaries of the potential for NdFeB
recycling.
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The basic R&D for grain boundary diﬀusion took 2 to 3 years.
The subsequent scaling up of such a technology from small scale
to volume production can take 6 to 24 months. As with material
substitution, one also needs to take into account product life
cycles: once the novel material becomes available it can take from
several months to 5 years before it is actually incorporated into
the ﬁnal products. After three years, a reduction of up to 50% of
dysprosium content had been achieved.
Material substitution.The producers of the ﬁnal goods that
use NdFeB can substitute on many levels, ranging from using a
lower grade of the same material to outright substitution of the
entire technological (sub)system (e.g., replacing wind energy
with photovoltaic energy). In our previous paper11 we high-
lighted the two most common types of substitution:
•Material substitution: the requirement of using magnets
remains in the ﬁnal product design, but this requirement is met
with a diﬀerent material (e.g., replacing NdFeB magnets with
samarium−cobalt magnets).
•Technological substitution: a product is redesigned to
operate without any magnets at all (e.g., replacing a direct
drive with a geared wind turbine).
On the basis of our most recent research, we add another type
of substitution:
•Grade optimization: a high-performance magnet is sub-
stituted by a low performance magnet with a lower REE content.
This can be done almost instantly.
The variety of substitution possibilities makes it challenging to
arrive at a comprehensive quantitative indicator. Nasser et al.
solved this by ﬁrst collecting data on a range of indicators
(substitute performance, substitute availability, comined fraction,
environmental impact ratio, and net import reliance ratio), then
giving these a weight, and ﬁnally calculating an overall sub-
stitutability score.44 This is an appropriate approach for com-
paring the substitutability of various elements for the purpose of
ranking them on criticality, but it does not yield the dynamics of
substitution that we are looking for in this work.
A time delay of implementing substitution can be quite
signiﬁcant, owing to the fact that it usually requires a product
redesign. Substitution will usually occur at the end of a product
life cycle, although this can be expedited in the case of acute
disruptions. The delay is highly dependent on the sector. Inter-
viewees indicated that, assuming no signiﬁcant R&D is necessary,
components of consumer products can be substituted within
several months. Strict regulations cause the automotive industry
to take a year, and the extremely risk-averse aerospace and
defense sectors can take up to ﬁve years.
One major global NdFeB supplier reported that overall,±10%
of their customers substituted NdFeB for samarium−cobalt
(SmCo) magnets and were not aware of any other types of
material substitution among their customer base. Roughly 20% of
their customers preferred to switch to lower grade NdFeB
magnets. Our impression is that Japanese manufacturers tried to
obtain their material at any cost, while European manufacturers
sometimes opted for temporarily using much lower grades of
NdFeB. Since grade optimization may negatively aﬀect perform-
ance and/or lifetime of the ﬁnal product, there is almost no
publishable data available on the topic, making it diﬃcult to
estimate the upper bound eﬀect of grade optimization on total
NdFeB demand. We note that the above quoted 20% is probably
an underestimation of the true extent of grade optimization.
Several audio equipment manufacturers and factory automa-
tion manufacturers reported that they almost completely sub-
stituted NdFeB magnets with non-REE magnets about 2 years
after the 2010 crisis. Siemens reported in 2014 that they were
working on producing wind turbines with dysprosium-free
NdFeB magnets “in a few years’ time”.45 One patent described a
method to replace dysprosium containing NdFeB magnets with
dysprosium-free NdFeB magnets that are twice as large.46 This
shows how substitution can have very diﬀerent goals and eﬀects
for individual applications.
In summary, we roughly estimate that the compound eﬀect
of substitution was to reduce demand for NdFeB by 10% of
total demand per year. If one is willing to implement systemic
substitution, the maximum magnitude will in theory be 100%.
However, interviewees indicated that for the overall market,
maximum magnitude will be limited to 20−50%. Another
interesting side eﬀect of substitution is that it may disrupt other
markets; the drastic price increase of NdFeB caused a knock-on
price increase of ∼10% for samarium cobalt magnets.
■ DISCUSSION
Four resilience mechanisms can be observed in supply chains of
critical materials reacting to a disruption: on the supply side,
diversity of supply and stockpiling, and on the demand side,
improving material properties and substitution. We introduce a
set of quantitative indicators for the assessment of these four
resilience mechanisms (time lag, response speed, and maximum
magnitude, see Table 1). These indicators are validated with the
2010 rare earth elements (REE) crisis as a case study, which
are often considered to be among the more critical materials.47,48
We focused speciﬁcally on neodymium. By deﬁning response
speed and maximum magnitude in terms of ‘% of total market’
rather than in absolute terms, the results of this case study can be
compared with other supply chain disruptions. The results are
summarized in Table 1.
The most salient of the ﬁndings is that substitution was the
most signiﬁcant system response. This contradicts Nassar et al.,
who concluded, based on expert consultation, that ‘substitutions
outside the REE family are often diﬃcult to impossible’.44
Substitution is highly dependent on the speciﬁc application. Our
event sequence analysis indicates that some producers rapidly
adapted to increasing prices by switching NdFeB for samarium−
cobalt magnets, while others temporarily used lower-grade
Table 1. Summary of Resilience Mechanism Parametersa
mechanism time lag response speed
maximum
magnitude
diversity: new
primary
production
1−13 years 4% of total
market/y
determined by
reserves base
diversity:
recycling
5−8 years <1% of total
market/y
limited by
production and
recycle rate
substitution months−5 years 10% of total
market/y
20−50% of total
market
changingmaterial
properties
2−3 years R&D + 1−5
years
implementation
15% of total
market/y
50% of dysprosium
content
stockpiling instantaneous instantaneous limited by stockpile
size
aTime lag denotes the lag between the 2010 REE crisis and the ﬁrst
observable response, with the range indicating the time it took various
actors to implement a given mechanism. Response speed is expressed
as the annual percentage with which the market substitutes, compared
to the total market volume at the beginning of the crisis. Maximum
magnitude indicates the maximum eﬀect a resilience mechanism can
eventually reach.
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NdFeB magnets. More thorough substitution involving product
redesigns followed a year or two after the disruption. Overall,
roughly 10% of total NdFeB demand was substituted each year.
Our research indicates that realistically up to 20−50% of demand
will be substituted, depending on future market conditions
(i.e., price).
Use of dysprosium as an alloying element was reduced
signiﬁcantly, both by substituting dysprosium-rich NdFeB alloys
for other alloys and by changing the production method of
temperature-resistant NdFeB magnets.
Non-Chinese primary production also increased within a year.
However, as seen in Figure 7, in absolute terms the ramp-up was
smaller than that of substitution (4% of total market volume per
year, compared to 10% for substitution). Since truly new
(i.e., greenﬁeld) primary production capacity takes 4 to 13 years
to come online, this relatively quick increase can be attributed to
increased production of REEs in mines that normally only mine
other metals and for whom market conditions suddenly made
coproduction of REEs worthwhile. Future greenﬁeld primary
production of neodymium will certainly feature extensive
coproduction with other REEs and, depending on ore com-
position, with other metals as well.
Signiﬁcant stockpiles were available at the beginning of the
disruption. However, in the perception of corporate NdFeB
consumers, these stockpiles were not large enough to cover the
time needed to implement measures such as substitution. This
caused some actors to acquire more material at almost any
cost, driving the price of REEs signiﬁcantly higher than other-
wise would have been justiﬁed. Thus, rather than cushioning the
supply disruption by releasing material from the stockpile,
additional stockpiling actually worsened the disruption into a
crisis. Interviewees indicated that the current level of stockpiling
is 6 to 12 months for Japanese car companies, while European
companies generally have a 2- to 5-week stockpile.
Finally, recycling is of note primarily because of its trivial
impact on the market, due to the problems with collecting and
processing NdFeB magnets from WEEE.43
Taken together, the resilience responses were of suﬃcient
magnitude that the supply chain should have experienced less of a
price shock than it actually did, especially considering the ease of
substitution and the size of stockpiles relative to the magnitude of
the disruption. In the following section we turn to analyzing the
supply chain as a whole to understand why this was so.
Resilience of the Overall NdFeB Supply Chain. As a
whole, the supply chain was able to compensate for the
2010 disruption in less than two years. The combined eﬀect of
substitution and increasing non-Chinese production is shown in
Figure 7. Two dynamics deserve to be highlighted: between 2010
and 2012 the resilience mechanisms were not able to compensate
for the decrease in production. During this same period, some
actors were increasing their stockpiles which led to a temporary
increase in REE demand. Other actors compensated by drawing
on their own stockpiles, using illegally sourced materials, or
even halting production altogether. After 2012, the resilience
mechanisms overshot the gap in primary production. Sub-
stitution in this period can be interpreted as so-called “demand
destruction”: demand that would have occurred post-2012, had
there been no disruption.
While it is debatable to what extent a two-year response time
can be seen as resilient, it is reasonable to believe that, as a result
of the crisis, the NdFeB supply chain system has become more
diversiﬁed and resilient. However, for the system to be truly
resilient, the current stockpiles should be large enough to pro-
vide resilience until the other mechanisms can take over. What
this means exactly is highly dependent on the type of actor and
product, but our interviewees indicated that one should generally
aim for a 3- to 9-month stockpile. Increased stockpiling might be
advisible, given that our research indicates that the current level
of stockpiling is 6 to 12 months for Japanese car companies and
European companies 2- to 5-week stockpile.
The fact that substitution and replacement of primary pro-
duction, and not recycling, were the main resilience mechanisms
has important implications for the idea of a circular economy.
Many reports on the circular economy will implicitly or explicitly
adhere to a reasoning along the lines of circularity being an easy
ﬁx for stagnating economies, resource constraints, and climate
change. For example, the Ellen McArthur Foundation writes that
‘resource productivity remains hugely underexploited as a source
of wealth, competitiveness and renewal’.49 The International
Solid Waste Association says that ‘price signals for raw materials
are a key driver in any change to the circular economy’.50
This case study provides an example where a supply disruption
and subsequent price peak did not nudge a system toward
circularity in any appreciable degree, and although the present
work only discusses the eﬀect of a single supply disruption,
it is relevant to the overall discussion on material scarcity
Figure 7. Chinese REE production shortfall (in red) and the combined eﬀect of the compensating resilience mechanisms (in blue).
Environmental Science & Technology Article
DOI: 10.1021/acs.est.6b05751
Environ. Sci. Technol. 2017, 51, 3860−3870
3868
because of the signiﬁcance and duration of this disruption.
If a two-year disruption causes almost no movement toward
more eﬀective material use, this implies that quite a long period
of sustained material constraints will be necessary for a production-
consumption system to naturally evolve toward a circular
conﬁguration.
If not eﬀective in nudging a transition toward circularity, the
REE crisis did have a diﬀerent eﬀect. Figure 4 shows that market
concentration is now higher for NdFeB production than for
primary production, with production capacity increasingly being
concentrated in China. This is not necessarily a problem from a
supply chain disruption point of view, because technical capacity
to produce NdFeB outside China exists. This statistic however
shows that the Chinese government’s goal of leveraging its
market dominance in REE production to force production
further in the value chain to China is successful.51
Lastly, we would like to comment on the status of the NdFeB
supply chain as a complex adaptive system. One of the deﬁning
elements of a complex system is that the agents inside the
system act more or less blindly, which gives rise to unplanned
emergent behavior. If one considers supply chains as complex
adaptive systems,52 then resilience can be seen as emergent
behavior.53
Rotmans and Loorbach distinguish between mechanistic
emergence and reﬂective emergence: ‘in systems exhibiting the
latter type of emergence, the observers are among the objects of
the system and have some reﬂective capacity, which enables them
to observe the emergence they produce’.54
When applying this distinction to the NdFeB supply chain, we
theorize that the emergent resilience responses to the 2010 REE
crisis are a form of mechanistic emergence. Many actors were
only dimly aware, if at all, of what was going on with actors one or
two steps removed from their own position in the supply chain.
Actors reactedmore or less blindly. The panic buying in late 2010
being a typical example of a resulting positive feedback loop.
However, after the crisis the intense scrutiny of the entire supply
chain resulted in a much higher level of information for all actors
involved. When actors now decide to redesign their products to
facilitate future substitution, this is an act under the umbrella of
reﬂective emergence. Additionally, one could argue that through
vertical integration of actors, both through acquisitions and
takeoﬀ agreements, the structure of the system itself has become
less complex.
Future Research. Although the indicators introduced in this
work are relevant to resilience analysis of critical materials in
general, we chose to focus on one particular case to allow for
greater depth in the exploration of the interaction between the
system disruptions and resilience responses. Inevitably, by doing
so we sacriﬁce some of the generalizability of our ﬁndings.
Further study of resilience dynamics in other metal supply chains
can reveal the extent to which the current results are general-
izable to other supply chains. Additionally, some resilience mech-
anisms might unfold over periods of time that outlast the time
period considered in this work. It is desirable that in the future
the present case study will be revisited as well. A further develop-
ment of indicators could involve a derivative type indicator, such
as the rate of increase of a problem divided by the response rate.55
This dynamic aspect of systems is relevant because comparing
the rate of change of the resilience mechanisms with the speed
with which a system can be disrupted gives insight into the overall
resilience of the system.56
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